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This article argues that the observed elasticity of substitution between military and
civilian labour within a defence ministry provides an indication of the likely scope for
eﬃcient outsourcing of military services. Military labour can only be employed by
government, so outsourcing military services to private ﬁrms requires replacement of
military labour with civilian labour. The degree to which such substitution occurs
under in-house provision oﬀers an insight into how much may be undertaken through
outsourcing without compromising operational eﬀectiveness. We obtain an estimate of
the elasticity of substitution between military and civilian labour in the UK over the
period 1970 and 2008 by estimating the Ministry of Defence's relative demand for mil-
itary labour. Instruments based on the relative supply of military labour are used to
account for the endogeneity of relative wages. The long run elasticity is estimated to be
around 0.75, though a value of 1 cannot be rejected. The estimated elasticity suggests
that there remains scope for further outsourcing of military activities in the UK.
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1 Introduction
This article is concerned with the optimal mix between public and private provision of defence.
Over the past 30 years the mix between public and private provision of defence activities
has been transformed in many countries, largely driven by a desire to produce defence more
eﬃciently. Today, neither the US nor the UK can deploy their Armed Forces without extensive
use of civilian contractors employed by private ﬁrms. At the height of the Gulf War twenty
years ago, the ratio of US contractors to uniformed military personnel was 0.017:1 (Camm
and Greenﬁeld, 2005, pp. 138139). As of March 2011 the ratio was 1.41:1 in Iraq and 0.91:1
in Afghanistan (having peaked at 2.23:1 in March 2008) (Schwartz and Swain, 2011). In April
2011 contractors accounted for around 35% of the UK MODs total workforce in Afghanistan
(Heidenkamp, 2012).
Whilst the use of private ﬁrms in defence is not new, what has changed is the number
and variety of tasks now being contracted out, including many in operational theatres. Even
activities which were once considered the sole preserve of the Armed Forces are now produced
under contract by private producers. For example, in the UK the provision and operation
of the RAF's air-to-air refueling capability, the training of military pilots, and the provision
of military communications satellites are contracted out. Similar changes have been seen
internationally, especially in the United States.1
The budgetary pressures now faced by defence departments in many countries, including
almost all NATO members, mean that private provision of defence and military activities
is likely to continue to expand. However, precise guidelines as to which aspects of defence
are most eﬃcently provided privately and which most eﬃciently produced publicly do not
currently exist.
Theoretical approaches are unable to make precise recommendations about speciﬁc ser-
vices and activities.2 In line with the corporate literature (Johnson et al., 2005), it is fre-
1Although in the US there is currently a moratorium on A-76 public-private competitions (Bailey Grasso,
2012) and there have been initiatives to bring back in-house some outsourced activities (Gates, 2009; Geren
and Casey, 2009).
2See, for example: Fredland and Kendry (1999) and Fredland (2004) for a transaction cost perspective;
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quently suggested that retaining core activities in-house and outsourcing noncore activities
improves eﬀectiveness by allowing greater focus on core activities. However, given the range,
complexity and interdependence of activites undertaken in order to produce national defence
it is not at all clear how to deﬁne the core of activities that should not be outsourced (Dunn
et al., 2011; Taylor and Tatham, 2008).
Ultimately, determining the most eﬃcient mix of public and private provision is an em-
pirical issue. However, in spite of the large empirical literature comparing the costs of public
and private provision of public services generally (see, for example, surveys by Andersson and
Jordahl (2011) and Jensen and Stonecash (2005)), there is relatively little speciﬁc to defence.
It is diﬃcult to construct direct comparisons of the costs of public and private provision of
military activities. They tend to be undertaken only once, or at most a few times, in each
country making impossible the cross-sectional and panel comparisons of diﬀerent forms of
provision widely used in other areas of public services (e.g. in refuse collection (Stevens, 1978;
Domberger et al., 1986; Ohlsson, 2003); in health (Propper et al., 2008); in water (Bel and
Warner, 2008)). Diﬀerences in the organisation of the production of defence across countries
mean that cross-country comparisons are unlikely to be comparing like-with-like. Compar-
ing activities before and after they are outsourced (e.g. Domberger et al., 2002; Kulmala
et al., 2006) is complicated by both changes to the speciﬁcation of the service at the time
of outsourcing, and by the available data being insuﬃciently detailed to allow a thorough
assessments of the costs and beneﬁts of outsourced contracts (Uttley, 2005).3
Given the diﬃculties of obtaining direct estimates of the relative eﬃciency of public and
private provision of defence activities, this article proposes that the elasticity of substitution
between military and civilian labour within a defence ministry oﬀers an indirect means to
infer the core and the likely scope for eﬃcient military outsourcing.
Martimort et al. (2005) for a survey of the incomplete contracts approach to outsourcing public services; Iossa
and Martimort (2008) and Martimort and Pouyet (2008) on Public Private Partnerships and the bundling
of provision of capital assets and services.
3Such information is frequently unavailable to even the contracting authority (US Government Account-
ability Oﬃce, 2005; National Audit Oﬃce, 2007, 2008). For example, comparison of the contract for RAF
air-to-air refueling with previous arrangements is impossible because the Ministry of Defence did not record
costs of in-house provision in a way that enabled comparison (National Audit Oﬃce, 2010).
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The rationale for this exploits the distinctive nature the military employment contract.
Although voluntarily entered into, they share some aspects of slavery; servicemen have no say
over when and where they serve, or what they are asked to do. Only government may enforce
such contracts, and it typically uses a mix of military and civilian labour when providing
military activities in-house (using the armed forces). Private ﬁrms can only hire civilian
labour. Given this, outsourcing military services to private ﬁrms requires replacement of
military labour with civilian labour. The degree to which such substitution occurs under
in-house provision oﬀers an insight into how much may be undertaken through outsourcing
without compromising operational eﬀectiveness: a high elasticity of substitution between
military and civilian labour suggests that the scope for eﬃcient outsourcing is large (since
the defence department is prepared to undertake lots of labour substitution when undertaking
an activity in-house); a low estimate suggests that the scope of outsourcing is limited, at least
without adversely aﬀecting output or capabilities.4
This article follows the approach of Ridge and Smith (1991) and MacDonald (2006) who
estimated the elasticity of substitution between capital and military labour and incorporates
civilian labour as a third factor in the military production function in order to explore
the possibility of substitution between military and civilian labour. Two previous papers
have considered substitution between labour types in military production functions. Smoker
(1979) examined the cost implications of the mix of military and civilian labour in the US
Department of Defense ﬁnding that replacing a military post with a civilian job frequently
leads to cost savings, but in 40% of cases actually increases the costs of performing that
role. Albrecht (1979) used a similar, though more disaggregated, production function to
that used here to consider the eﬃcient allocation of experienced and inexperienced military
manpower in seventeen United States Air Force occupational specialities. A similar approach
4Rather than substituting civilian labour for the military labour they are unable to hire, it is possible
that private contractors will instead substitute equipment for military labour. Previous studies suggest that
the elasticity of substitution between capital and military labour within a (two factor) military production
function is low: Smith et al. (1987) estimated it to be around 0.6 in a 1976 cross section of countries. For
UK time series data MacDonald (2006) obtained and estimated elasticity of close to zero respectively. These
results suggest that the scope for replacing military labour with capital is not large.
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is used in the literature investigating substitution between more and less educated workers
(e.g. Ciccone and Peri, 2005; Katz and Murphy, 1992).
The remainder of the article is devoted to obtaining an estimate of the elasticity of
substitution between military and civilian labour within the UK's Ministry of Defence (MOD)
over the period 19702008. Estimates of the elasticity are obtained by estimating the relative
demand for military and civilian labour. To account for the likely endogeneity of relative
wages instruments based on the relative supply of military labour are used: the proportion of
the population young enough to serve in the armed forces and the numbers of young people
in full-time education. The estimated long run elasticity is around 0.75, though a value of
1 cannot be rejected, suggesting that there remains further scope for outsourcing military
activities in the UK over and above that already undertaken. As well as allowing inference
as to the scope for eﬃcient outsourcing to be made, an accurate estimate of the elasticity
of substitution between military and civilian labour may also allow forecasts of the armed
forces' labour costs, and the implications of aging populations, to be improved.
The next section outlines the approach taken and derives the relative demand for military
and civilian labour. Section 3 details the data used and justiﬁes the instruments used to
account for the endogeneity of relative wages. The results are presented and discussed in
Section 4 and ﬁnally some conclusions are drawn.
2 Approach
Three factors are used in the production of defence: military labour, LM , civilian labour, LC ,
and capital, K (comprized all factors other than labour). Military output, M , is produced










Labour and capital enter the production function in a (weakly) separable way such that
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military and civilian labour are ﬁrst combined according to a constant returns to scale,
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) labour aggregation function. This aggregate labour
input is then combined with capital to produce output. A CES aggregation function is chosen
because, although it may be desirable to allow the elasticity of substitution between labour
types to change over the sample period, the small sample size (39 observations) makes this
unfeasible.
If labour and capital are separable, the relative factor demand for military labour depends
only on the labour aggregation function.5 The elasticity of substitution between military and
civilian labour is σ = 1/ (1− θ).
Given the military production function (1), if: the military are cost-minimizers; the level
of output is exogenously given by government; and input prices are exogenously given, then
the logged relative demand for military labour (L) may be written as:
L = a− σW (2)
where L = ln (LM/LC), W = ln (WM/WC) and WM and WC are military and civilian wages
respectively.6
Although deriving the relative demand (2) requires a number of troublesome assumptions
(especially separability and constant returns), its advantage is that it allows the elasticity
of substitution between military and civilian labour to be estimated without requiring infor-
mation on either the stock and price of capital or defence output. Data on the stock and
price of military capital are simply not available. Defence output is diﬃcult to deﬁne, let
alone measure. It may be considered to be peace and security, whether achieved through
deterrence or conﬂict; the value of lives saved (Sandler and Hartley, 1995); force readiness
5Separability is not an innocuous assumption: it implies the (untestable without data on capital) restric-
tions that the ease of substitution between each labour types and capital are both equal and unaﬀected by
the stock of capital.
6Although the same relative demand might also be obtained by adopting a simple three factor CES pro-
duction function, or Sato type two level CES production function. The interpretation relying on separability
is preferred because it avoids the need to assume that the elasticity of substitution between labour types and
capital is the same as the elasticity of substitution between labour types.
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or capabilities (Warner and Asch, 1995; Ministry of Defence, 2004; Anagboso and Spence,
2008). Many of these aspects of output are unmeasurable and there is no single measure
which captures its multifarious nature.
There are two major diﬃculties with obtaining an estimate of σ using Equation (2). The
ﬁrst is that it implicitly assumes instantaneous adjustment of labour demands to changes in
wages. Military labour, however, takes time to adjust because it take time to train recruits,
military employment contracts are relatively long, and there is a need to maintain an appro-
priate mix of experience and rank. To account for this, (2) is taken to be the desired relative
demand for labour (L∗) in a partial adjustment process:
Lt = Lt−1 + λ (L∗t − Lt−1) (3)
with the adjustment parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] and expected to lie in the upper half of its permis-
sible range. Equations (2) and (3) yield the basic estimating equation:
Lt = α + β1lnLt−1 + β2Wt (4)
Equation 4 allows estimates of the short-run (λσ = −β2) and long-run (σ = β2/ (β1 − 1))
elasticities of substitution between military and civilian labour to be obtained.
The second diﬃculty is the likely endogeneity of the relative wage for military labour,
Wt. As the relative numbers of military and civilian labour employed by the MOD and the
wage premium for military labour are simultaneously determined by supply and demand, the
relative wage of military labour on the right hand side of (4) is likely to be endogenous. To
account for the endogeneity of the relative wage two instruments based on the relative supply
of military labour are proposed. If valid instruments, these allow Instrumental Variables
estimation to obtain consistent (if not unbiased in ﬁnite samples) estimates of (4). Both
instruments are related to the relative supply of military labour, and are suggested by the
key challenges to recruitment and retention facing NATO members (NATO, 2007). The ﬁrst
7
is the proportion of the labour force eligible for military service, the second is the number
of young people in full time education. They are detailed in Section 3. The identifying
assumption is that shifts in each are independent of expected shifts in the relative demand
for military labour.
3 Data and instruments
The data used to estimate the long- and short-run elasticities of substitution between military
and civilian labour are time-series for the UK over the period 1970 to 2008.7 The ratio of
military to civilian labour employed, L, is represented by the ratio of the reported strength
of the UK regular armed forces to the number of MOD civilian employees, both as at 1st
April each year.8 The measure of civilian labour required in Section 2 (LC in Equation
(1)) is total inputs of civilian labour into production of defence. This includes both civilian
labour employed directly by the MOD and indirect inputs on civilian labour used in the
production of contracted-out defence activities. Data on the number of staﬀ involved in the
production of contracted out defence activities does not exist, so the number of civilians
directly employed by the MOD is used here as a proxy for total civilian labour inputs. The
omitted civilian labour inputs from contracted-out activities is likely to become increasingly
important towards the end of the sample. In order to account for this increasing importance
a trend is added to Equation (4) when estimated. It also allows for the possibility of a
trending component in the eﬃciency parameter, A, of the labour aggregation function within
Equation (1).
7The data are taken from various issues of the Annual Abstract of Statistics (Oﬃce for National Statistics,
various years), UK Defence Statistics (Ministry of Defence, various years) and the Statement on the Defence
Estimates Vol II (Secretary of State for Defence, various years), Education and Training Statistics UK and
its predecessor Education Statistics UK (Department for Education, various years). Where diﬀerent issues
contain diﬀerent ﬁgures the later (presumably revised) ﬁgures are preferred.
8Strength of the regular armed forces excludes personnel locally entered overseas (such as Gurkhas),
mobilized reservists and reservists on Full Time Reserve Service. MOD civilian employees are both UK
based and locally engaged. In 2004 the MOD changed the way it counted its civilian staﬀ. Consequently, the
number of civilian employees reported since 2004 is not comparable with earlier years. To avoid discontinuity,
the numbers of civilian employees in years 2004-2008 have been calculated by inﬂating the reported 2003 ﬁgure
by the annual percentage increase in MOD Level 0 civilian staﬀ.
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The ratio of military to civilian wages,W , is represented by the ratio of MOD expenditure
on military and civilian personnel. Expenditure on personnel is preferred to basic wages
because it better reﬂects the total costs of employing each type of labour. The MOD will alter
its relative demand for military labour not only in response to changes in relative wages, but
also to changes in the other costs of employing military rather than civilian staﬀ. In addition
to basic wages, the overall costs of employing military labour include employment include
the costs of allowances paid, recruitment, retention, retirement and death beneﬁts, training,
housing, etc. (Sandler and Hartley, 1995). Whilst some of these additional employment costs
are also paid for civilian labour, they are likley to be higher for military labour: the overall
employment costs of military labour may be as much as double basic wage costs (Warner
and Negrusa, 2006).
The instruments used to account for the endogeneity of relative wages are both based on
the relative supply of military and civilian labour to the MOD. The ﬁrst is the proportion of
the labour force of a suitable age to be recruited into the armed forces. Only the relatively
young have the capacity to develop the requisite ﬁtness to serve in the armed forces so the
pool of potential recruits for military labour is only a fraction of the entire labour force.
Civilian labour employed by the MOD (or indeed private ﬁrms) may be any age, and may be
drawn from the entire labour force. This is reﬂected in the age distributions of the MOD's
military and civilian labour: on 1st April 2011 50.2% of armed forces personnel were aged
19-29 compared with only 9.7% of MOD civilians, and only 2.5% were aged 50 and over
compared with 42.5% of MOD civilians (Ministry of Defence, 2011). The armed forces are
also overwhelmingly male - on 1st April 2011 90.4% of full-time armed forces personnel were
male. In contrast, only 52.7% of MOD full-time civilian employees were male (Ministry of
Defence, 2011). Given this, the variable used to represent the proportion of the working age
population eligible for military recruitment, POP , is the UK population of males aged 15-29
divided by the total working age population (males aged 15-64 and females aged 15-59).
The justiﬁcation for POP being a valid instrument is that the smaller the proportion of the
labour force eligible for joining the armed forces then, for any given level of military labour,
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the greater the proportion of the pool of potential recruits that must be recruited to maintain
a given level of military labour. Since the UK has an all volunteer force, recruiting a greater
proportion of the pool of potential recruits requires a higher wage premium to be paid to
military labour. The factors determining POP are demographic and outside the MOD's
control, so the identifying assumption that changes in POP are independent of changes in
the relative demand for military labour seems reasonable.
The second instrument proposed is the numbers of young people in full-time education,
EDU . This is represented by the number of students (in millions) in full time Further or
Higher Education in the UK plus the number of school pupils aged (as at 31st August each
year) 15 or over. The rationale for EDU being an appropriate instrument is that the armed
forces tend to recruit mainly those with fewer educational qualiﬁcations. The armed forces
traditionally recruit school leavers (with the possible exception of oﬃcers who make up only
17% of strength) and large numbers of unskilled and lower educated workers. An increase
in the numbers of young people pursuing Further and Higher Education reduces this pool of
potential recruits targeted by the armed forces (National Audit Oﬃce, 2006).
Furthermore, the educational qualiﬁcations of military labour are considerably below the
national average. Although the the MOD does not routinely collect information on the
educational background of its personnel (National Audit Oﬃce, 2006), around 45% of young
people in the UK leave school with 5 GCSEs graded A-C whereas Army recruits average
only 0.9 GCSEs graded A-C (House of Commons Defence Select Committee, 2005). Many
recruits opt for a career in the armed forces as a last resort - when they have exhausted
their alternative career options.9 Pursuing education for longer opens up a greater range of
alternative careers. If the proportion of potential recruits remaining in education increases,
since when they qualify they are less likely to opt for a military career, the relative supply
of military labour will fall.
Although government policy has driven the increase in Further and Higher Education
9A survey of British Army recruits (albeit with a small sample and in only one city) showed that 40%
joined as a last resort (House of Commons Defence Select Committee, 2005, Ev 255-256).
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participation rates in the UK since the 1980s, these policies have not been driven by the MOD.
It seems reasonable to assume that changes in the numbers of young people in education are
independent of the MOD's relative demand for military labour.
4 Empirical results
Table 1 reports the results of estimating Equation (4) with a trend added. OLS results
are reported in the second column, and separate just-identiﬁed IV estimates for each of the
instruments in the third and fourth columns. POP and EDU are used in separate models to
minimize concerns as to their potential weakness since just-identiﬁed IV estimates are median
unbiased (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). OLS estimates are presented both for comparison and
because it is not certain that the wage ratio is endogenous. Military wages in the UK are
(in practice if not in principle) set independently by the Armed Forces Pay Review Body
(AFPRB). In the market for civilian labour, the MOD is a relatively small employer in the
market and might be thought of as facing a perfectly elastic supply of civilian labour. If this
is the case then the wages of MOD civilians are exogenously determined in the overall labour
market. If both civilian and military wages are exogenous then OLS will be a consistent and
unbiased estimator.
In Table 1 the serial correlation tests suggest the models suﬀer from serially correlated
errors (though provide only weak evidence for the OLS and POP estimates). This may well
be due to misspeciﬁed dynamics with the partial adjustment process applied to the basic
relative demand (2) not fully capturing the MOD's diﬃculties of adjusting levels of military
labour. Although not reported, richer dynamic structures have been estimated allowing a
second lag of the dependent variable, Lt−2, and an Autoregressive Distributed Lag, ADL(2,2),
model. Allowing for further lags was felt to compromise (the already small) sample size too
far. For each model the restrictions necessary to obtain the speciﬁcation in Table 1 cannot
be rejected at any conventional level. Because of this, all test statistics in Tables 1 and 3 are
robust to serial correlation.
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Table 1: Estimates of the relative demand for military labour
Instrument − POP EDU
Estimator OLS IV FULLER IV FULLER
Constant 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.10*** 0.09***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Trend 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Lt−1 0.75*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.56*** 0.58***
(0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.14)
Wt -0.18*** -0.24** -0.23** -0.42** -0.39***
(0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.17) (0.15)
Long run elasticity -0.704*** -0.794*** -0.790*** -0.958*** -0.941***
(0.238) (0.240) (0.239) (0.236) (0.232)
N 39 39 39 39 39
AC1  χ
2 (2) 3.07* 3.67* 3.62* 9.73*** 9.03***
AC2  χ
2 (2) 3.82 4.48 4.44 9.75*** 9.07**
HET1 χ2 (1) 0.01 0.001 0.0004 0.08 0.06
HET2 χ2 (3) 3.44 0.24 0.26 0.62 0.61
RESET  χ2 (3) 8.42** 2.93 3.01 3.12 3.37
Endogeneity  χ2 (1) − 0.77 4.41**
Notes: Newey-West serial correlation robust standard errors reported in parentheses using bandwidth
3 ' T 13 (Baum et al., 2007). Signiﬁcance levels denoted by * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. RESET
tests based on serial correlation robust VCE: for OLS test is Ramsey type test, for IV is Pesaran
and Taylor's (Pesaran and Taylor, 1999) test; both use the square, cube and fourth power of the
(forecast for IV) predicted values. Serial correlation tests based on standard VCE: for OLS are
Breusch-Godfrey test for 1 and 2 lags, for IV are Cumby and Huizinga tests.
Heteroskedasticity tests are Koenker's test for OLS using ﬁtted values (HET1) and all
regressors excluding constant as indicator variables (HET2); for IV the corresponding tests
are Pagan-Hall tests using the level of the ﬁtted values of the dependent variable (constructed
using the ﬁrst stage instruments) and all exogenous variables except the constant (included
and excluded instruments). The Endogeneity test is a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test.
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Table 2: Tests for structural break at the end of the Cold War
OLS IV
Break in: POP EDU
1990 7.47 4.70 0.61
1992 1.90 0.21 0.81
1994 3.02 1.64 1.94
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels denoted by * p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All test statistics
distributed as χ2 (4).
Since the sample straddles the end of the Cold War, the possibility of a structural break
at the end of the Cold War must be considered, especially since evidence of a break has been
found in similar samples (MacDonald, 2006). Whilst a structural break may be suspected,
it is not a foregone conclusion since the end of the Cold War resulted in a reduction in the
volume of defence produced rather than a shift in the fundamental technology of defence.
Table 2 shows the results of applying Chow type tests of parameter stability allowing for a
break in each of the models considered over a range of feasible break points. None suggests
the presence of a structural break at the end of the Cold War in any of the models in Table
1.
Although formal testing of the assumptions used in Section 2 to derive the relative demand
(4) is not possible without data on capital, an informal check may be provided by including
in the relative demand a measure of defence output and testing its signiﬁcance. Logged real
military expenditures (frequently used as a proxy for output (MacDonald, 2006; Ridge and
Smith, 1991; Smith et al., 1987)) is not signiﬁcant at any conventional level when added
to any of the models in Table 1. This provides some reassurance, since signiﬁcance would
suggest that the true technology was nonhomothetic making a separable CES production
function inappropriate.
The validity and strength of POP and EDU as instruments for relative wages must also
be addressed. This is especially important given the small sample used here, since if they are
not strongly correlated with the relative wage, W , any IV estimates relying upon them may
be seriously and give misleading estimates of signiﬁcance.
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Table 3 reports the ﬁrst stage results for the IV models in Table 1. The ﬁrst stage
coeﬃcients on each of the instruments are both signiﬁcant and of the expected signs: for POP
a fall in the proportion of the population eligible for military service causes an increase in the
relative wages for military labour; for EDU an increase in the numbers. The magnitudes of
the coeﬃcients in Table 3 also seem reasonable. The signiﬁcant statistics for the (robust to
non-iid errors) Kleibergen and Paap (2006) tests of underidentiﬁcation suggests both models
are identiﬁed.
For the model using POP as an instrument, the F -statistic for excluded instruments of
25.94 exceeds the Stock and Yago (2005) critical value for 10% maximal size (16.38). On this
basis POP does not appear to be a weak instrument. However, the F -statistic for EDU of
8.725 suggests EDU is a weak instrument for the wage ratio  the Stock and Yogo critical
values indicate a true rejection rate of more than 15% and suggest that EDU is weak enough
to cause signiﬁcant biases in the estimated coeﬃcients. Given this, estimation using POP
as an instrument is preferred to using EDU .
Focusing on the results of the OLS and POP models in Table 1, the apparent absence of
conditional heteroskedasticity justiﬁes the use of IV over a more general estimator such as
GMM.10 The estimated coeﬃcients on Lt−1 are in the upper half of the permissible [0, 1] range
as expected. The coeﬃcient of primary interest is that on Wt  the short run elasticity of
substitution between military and civilian labour. These are of the expected sign, signiﬁcant
in both models and relatively similar. The estimated long-run elasticities are also signiﬁcant
and relatively similar (at least not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent). The results suggest that a 1%
increase in the relative wages of military labour causes a 0.2% fall in the military proportion
of MOD labour and that over time this rises to around 0.75%. For neither model can a
hypothesis that the elasticity of substitution between military and civilian labour is equal
to one be rejected. An elasticity of one would be consistent with the MOD having a ﬁxed
proportion of expenditure allocated to personnel which it switches between military and
10Under conditional homoskedasticity both IV and GMM are consistent and asymptotically eﬃcient, but
GMM may have poor small sample properties (Baum et al., 2003).
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Table 3: First Stage and Reduced Form Estimates
First stage estimates Reduced form estimates
Dependent variable Wt Lt
Instrument POP EDU POP EDU
Constant 1.63*** -0.51** -0.32*** 0.31***
(0.28) (0.24) (0.15) (0.10)
Trend 0.008** -0.02 0.005*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.02) (0.002) (0.006)
Lt−1 -0.48*** 0.06 0.82*** 0.54***





N 39 39 39 39
RSS 0.133 0.204 0.0428 0.0389
Adjusted R2 0.761 0.633 0.977 0.979




Notes: All statistics robust to serial correlation using Newey-West VCE with bandwidth
3 ' T 1/3(Baum et al., 2007). Serial correlation robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Signiﬁcance levels denoted by * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Kleibergen-Paap (2006)
is test of underidentiﬁcation.
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civilian staﬀ in response to changes in relative prices.
For the POP model, a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test cannot reject a hypothesis that the
relative wage is exogenous (because the estimates are so similar). If true, OLS estimation
is consistent and unbiased and the OLS estimates should be preferred on eﬃciency grounds.
That the two models produce such similar results is reassuring.
The signiﬁcant RESET statistic of the OLS results is a little troubling, but not surprising
given the simple form adopted for the relative demand used here. Whilst there is a possi-
bility that it is picking up endogeneity (since the very similar POP estimates do not have
a signiﬁcant statistic in the analogous test) or serial correlation (Leung and Yu, 2001), it is
most likely to reﬂect some missing nonlinearities or general misspeciﬁcation. It suggests that
the results in Table 1 are to treated cautiously and interpreted as a broad indication of the
substitution possibilities between labour types in the military production function.
It is diﬃcult to interpret the estimated elasticity precisely because it has been estimated
for directly employed MOD labour and not the total civilian labour (MOD and private
contractor employed) used in the production of defence demanded by LC in equation 2.
The rise in the MOD's reliance on outsourced provision over the sample period means that
the estimate produced above is an underestimate of the true elasticity, but the magnitude
of the diﬀerence between the estimated and true values of σ is unknown. What is certain
is that some cases of successful substitution are not captured (e.g. the successful use of
civilian labour in the provision of support for fast jets (National Audit Oﬃce, 2007)). This
diﬀerence suggests that the estimated elasticity is best interpreted as estimating the scope
for substitution over and above that caused by outsourcing arrangements already entered
into. It suggests that there is some (probably limited) scope for further eﬃcient outsourcing
of military activities in the UK.
The dataset used also imposes some further limitations: Firstly, the estimates are ob-
tained from a small sample of only 39 observations. Not only is the sample small, but the
sample period encompasses several large changes in the strategic environment facing the UK.
Although the end of the Cold War does not seem to aﬀect parameter stability, the sample
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size makes it impossible to investigate the full range of possible structural breaks and the
possibility that the elasticity of substitution has changed over the sample period.
Secondly, the number of directly employed MOD civilians fell sharply during the 1980s
due to the programme of privatisations, such as that of the Royal Dockyards. This fall
may account for the trending nature of LM/LC , but is unrelated to relative wages. Thirdly,
military wages are set by the AFPRB at the level of comparable civilian occupations plus
some X-factor. This means that there is not a large amount of variability in the wage ratio,
and reduces the precision of the estimates obtained.
Finally, there are some limitations due to the derivation of the relative demand for military
labour used to estimate the elasticity. Separability and constant returns have been discussed
above and partially addressed by testing the signiﬁcance of military spending. However, cost-
minimisation by the MOD is also required in the the derivation of the relative demand (2).
The military are commonly perceived as being ineﬃcient, at least anecdotal (for instance in
equipment procurement). Indeed, the most common justiﬁcation for contracting-out is that
the private sector can produce eﬃciently, whereas the public sector cannot. If the MOD was
not at all concerned about cost one would expect an elasticity of (close to) zero because it
would deﬁne ﬁxed roles for each type of labour with no substitution in response to changes
in relative prices. Our results do not support this, as they suggest some substitution occurs
within the MOD. However, if private ﬁrms are able to use labour more ﬂexibly  which is
frequently cited as one of their advantages  they will have greater substitution possibilities
than the MOD. This would cause our estimates, based solely on the MOD's past behaviour,
to underestimate the scope for substitution of civilian labour for military labour, and so to
underestimate the scope for outsourcing military activities.
5 Conclusion
This article uses time series data for the UK over the period 19702008 to estimate the
elasticity of substitution between military and civilian labour within the MOD based on
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the relative demand for military labour. The long run elasticity is found to be signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent to zero. The best point estimate is about 0.75 and the elasticity is likely to be
between 0.5 and 1, though a value of 1 cannot be rejected. The article argues that the
elasticity can be used to infer the likely scope for eﬃcient outsourcing of military activities.
The estimated elasticity of 0.75 suggests that there remains some limited scope for further
eﬃcient outsourcing of MOD activities in the UK. It does not, however, suggest precisely
which activities should be outsourced.
Although both OLS estimates and IV estimates using the proportion of the population
eligible for military service as an instrument produce very similar estimates, the results have
a number of caveats: i) they are based on a small sample size and this restricts the form
of the relative demand estimated to be relatively simple; ii) the data used for estimation
may not be close enough to the theoretical variables required to allow accurate estimates
to be obtained; and iii) the approach adopted here relies on a number assumptions which
may not be valid. The latter two caveats mean that the estimated elasticity may understate
substitution possibilities and so the potential for outsourcing.
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